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SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
  Ronald C. Bachner appeals from the decision of the United States Tax Court 
sustaining the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of deficiencies in 
and additions to Bachner's federal income taxes for the tax years 1984 and 1985.  Bachner 
claims that the applicable statute of limitations bars assessment for each year.   
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 In 1984 and 1985, Bachner was employed as a laboratory technician by the 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation.  In November 1984, he sent the first of three letters 
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), all requesting assurance that his filing of a tax 
return would not cause him to be treated as having "relinquished" any of his 
constitutional rights.  The District Director responded with letters emphasizing that the 
Internal Revenue Code mandated the filing of returns, describing the penalties otherwise 
applicable, and urging Bachner to submit the required information and pay the required 
amount. 
 On April 15, 1985, Bachner filed a timely Form 1040 for the 1984 tax year.  In 
addition to providing his name, social security number, and other identification 
information, Bachner reported $24,441.71 on Line 7, captioned "Wages, salaries, tips, 
etc.", and attached the Form W-2 from his employer stating the same amount of 
compensation. 
 Bachner typed "XXXXXX" over the caption designated "Moving expense" on Line 24, 
and typed the amount $24,441.71 in the space provided.  He added in the margin the note 
"No Income or Taxable Compensation See Attached Letter and Eisner v. Macomber 252 US 189."  
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He attached a letter along with the Form W-2, in which he claimed a refund of "erroneously 
withheld" federal income taxes, cited twenty-two court decisions and the Internal Revenue 
Code for support, and stated that his submission did not constitute a waiver of any 
rights.  By applying his claimed deduction against his stated income, Bachner reported 
zero taxable income.  He further claimed a refund of $4,396.95, the total amount withheld 
as taxes from his year's salary.  The withheld taxes were not refunded. 
 At approximately the same time Bachner filed this return for 1984, Bachner filed 
three Forms 1040X (Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return), claiming refund of federal 
income taxes he had paid for the 1981, 1982 and 1983 tax years.  Each of the claims 
included the statement "I have no income or taxable compensation," and was accompanied by 
the same letter Bachner had attached to his 1984 return. 
 In March 1985, Bachner filed with his employer a Form W-4 (Employee's 
Withholding Allowance Certificate), on which he claimed exemption from income tax 
withholding.  Bachner indicated on the form that he did not owe any federal income tax for 
the previous year and would not for the current year, and that he had a right to a full 
refund of all income tax withheld for the previous year and expected the same for the 
current year. 
 In August 1985, the IRS asked Bachner to provide further information regarding 
his claimed exemption from income tax withholding.  Bachner responded by a letter again 
declaring that he had no taxable income and again attached the letter he had attached to 
his 1984 Form 1040 and to each of his three Forms 1040X.  Multiple rounds of 
correspondence followed, with the IRS notifying Bachner that it deemed his claim of 
exemption invalid and had directed his employer to withhold accordingly. Predictably, 
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Bachner repeatedly disputed the IRS's authority to do so and asserted the validity of his 
exemption claim.  
 Bachner earned $26,901.76 in wages in 1985, of which $1,547.71 was withheld as 
federal income tax.  Bachner filed no Form 1040 or 1040A for the 1985 tax year.  
 In June 1989, Bachner was indicted on one count of tax evasion for the 1985 tax 
year, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and four counts of filing false, fictitious or 
fraudulent claims for tax refund for the 1981 through 1984 tax years, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 287.  After a jury trial in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Bachner was 
acquitted of all charges.  
 In December 1990, Bachner received two letters from the IRS, one regarding his 
tax liability for the 1984 tax year and the other for the 1985 tax year.  The letters, 
with identical text, stated in their entirety: 
Based on the information you have provided, the account specified 
above is resolved.  We may contact you in the future, if further 
issues arise requiring clarification.  At present, no further response 
is needed on the above account. 
 
App. at 60-61.  
 
 On September 11, 1992, the IRS issued to Bachner a notice of deficiency fo
1984 and 1985 tax years.  The notice asserted tax deficiencies of $4,096 for 1984 and 
$4,708 for 1985, and additions for fraud pursuant to I.R.C. § 6653(b) of $2,048 for 1984, 
and $2,354 plus 50 percent of the interest due on the unpaid deficiency of $3,161 for 
1985.  The asserted deficiencies did not reflect the amounts withheld of $4,397 in 1984 
and $1,547 in 1985.   
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 Bachner petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of the asserted 
deficiencies for both years.  Bachner relied on the statute of limitations in § 6501(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, which limits assessment to "within 3 years after the return was 
filed."  With respect to the 1984 tax year, he contended that the Form 1040 he had filed, 
though irregular in format, provided information sufficient for the IRS to have computed 
his tax liability for that year, and therefore it qualified as a "return" adequate to 
trigger the running of the statute of limitations.   Bachner conceded that he had filed no 
Form 1040 or 1040A for the 1985 tax year, but claimed that the Form W-2 submitted by his 
employer equipped the IRS with data sufficient to determine his tax liability for 1985.  
Therefore, the W-2 "filed on his behalf" served as a "return" within the meaning of I.R.C. 
§ 6501(a) and marked the commencement of the three-year limitations period. Finally, 
Bachner argued that even if the Forms 1040 and W-2 were not "returns" upon submission, the 
IRS's subsequent communication in December 1990, declaring his accounts for 1984 and 1985 
"resolved," constituted after-the-fact "acceptance" of the documents as valid tax returns.    
 Following a trial at which all the relevant facts were stipulated, the Tax Court 
sustained the Commissioner's determination of deficiencies with respect to both years.  
The court held that the statute of limitations was inapplicable and both years remained 
open to assessment since neither the unusual Form 1040 filed for 1984 nor the W-2 
Bachner's employer submitted for 1985 qualified as a "return" that would commence the 
running of the statute of limitations under § 6501(a).  The court further held that the 
December 1990 letters neither purported to be, nor effectively constituted, waivers of the 
IRS's filing requirements.  
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 In addition to deciding that there were deficiencies in income taxes due for the 
tax years 1984 and 1985 in the amounts of $4,096 and $4,708 respectively, the Tax Court 
imposed additions to tax for Bachner's negligent underpayment of taxes    for the tax 
years 1984 and 1985 under I.R.C. § 6653(a), and for Bachner's failure to file a return for 
the tax year 1985 under I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1). 
 The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §§6213(a) and 7442, and we have 
jurisdiction over Bachner's appeal pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
II. 
Discussion 
 Decisions of the Tax Court are reviewed in the same manner as district court 
decisions in non-jury civil actions. See Holof v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 
1989); 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  The issues on appeal involve only questions of statutory 
construction and application, and therefore we conduct de novo review.  See Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1992). 
A. 
Tax Year 1984 
 This case turns on our interpretation of the three-year statute of limitations 
on assessment of taxes found in I.R.C. §6501(a) (1994).  That provision reads in full:  
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax 
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the 
return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the 
date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after 
such tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the 
date on which any part of such tax was paid, and no proceeding in 
court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun 
after the expiration of such period. 
 
(emphasis added). 
  
 With respect to Bachner's 1984 tax year, the Tax Court sustained the 
Commissioner's deficiency determination, accepting the Commissioner's contention tha
Bachner's Form 1040 was not a valid "return" and that therefore the 1984 year remained 
open to assessment.  On appeal, the Commissioner now concedes the validity of Bachner's 
Form 1040 as a tax return, and thus acknowledges that the three-year limitations period on 
his 1984 tax year has expired.  The Commissioner distinguishes Bachner's 1984 return from 
that held inadequate in Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff'd, 793 F.2d 139 
(6th Cir. 1986), on which the Tax Court relied, on the ground that the modifications on 
Bachner's return were neither as extensive nor as obfuscatory as those made by Beard.  The 
Commissioner now only requests that we vacate the Tax Court's decision with respect to the 
deficiency in and addition to tax for the 1984 tax year and remand for determination of 
whether, and to what extent, Bachner has made any overpayment of taxes for that year. 
 Bachner agrees that the Tax Court decision should be vacated.  However, he 
contends that inasmuch as it is conceded that the Commissioner's assessment for 1984 is 
time-barred, he is now entitled to a refund of all taxes withheld from his 1984 salary.  
He argues that because there are no factual issues outstanding for resolution, this court 
should order a refund for that amount. 
 We reject the course Bachner proposes.  First, the fact that the parties agree 
that I.R.C. § 6501(a) bars the Commissioner from assessment with respect to the 1984 tax 
year is not determinative of any refund claim filed by Bachner for that year.  The 
language in section 6501 refers only to "limitations on assessment and collection," and 
the operative clause of section 6501(a) directs only that taxes "be assessed within 3 
 years after the return was filed."  I.R.C. § 6501 (1995).  A deficiency determination, by 
which the IRS seeks to establish the taxpayer's additional tax liability, is patently 
different from a refund determination, by which the taxpayer seeks repayment or credit 
from the IRS.   
 The mutual independence of deficiency determinations and refund determinations 
was established in Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932).  There, the taxpayer claimed, 
inter alia, deductions for attorney's fees and inheritance taxes paid.  The Commissioner 
disallowed all deductions except that for attorney's fees, and assessed a deficiency 
within the limitations period. The taxpayer paid the deficiency and then requested a 
refund. The Commissioner rejected the refund claim, and, although the statute of 
limitations had run by then, asserted that even if the inheritance-tax deduction should 
have been allowed, the attorney-fee deduction had been improperly allowed and that the 
deficiency would be even greater than that originally asserted and paid. Id. at 282.  
 The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner's authority to reaudit a return 
whenever repayment is claimed is necessarily implied.  The Court also stated: 
An overpayment must appear before refund is authorized.  Although the 
statute of limitations may have barred the assessment and collection 
of any additional sum, it does not obliterate the right of the United 
States to retain payments already received when they do not exceed the 
amount which might have been properly assessed and demanded. 
 
Id. at 283. 
 In Lewis, there was the complication, never expressly mentioned, that the 
Commissioner's assertion of an alternative ground for his earlier assessment was made 
after the statute of limitations had run.  In contrast, the Commissioner here merely 
collected and thereafter retained the tax funds withheld from Bachner's 1984 salary.  
 Absent a determination of overpayment, the Commissioner's concession of a time-bar leaves 
unaffected the question of a requested refund. 
 Second, the Internal Revenue Code makes clear that a Tax Court determination of 
overpayment is a prerequisite to any award of the amount of such overpayment where a 
notice of deficiency has been issued and redetermination sought in the Tax Court.  I.R.C. 
§ 7459(e) (1994) provides: 
If the assessment or collection of any tax is barred by any statute of 
limitations, the decision of the Tax Court to that effect shall be 
considered as its decision that there is no deficiency in respect of 
such tax. 
 
I.R.C. § 6512(b)(1) (1994), in turn, describes the required jurisdictional path after a 
finding of no deficiency: 
[I]f the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further finds 
that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax for the same 
taxable year, . . . the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to determine 
the amount of such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the 
decision of the Tax Court has become final, be credited or refunded to 
the taxpayer.  
 
 
Finally, I.R.C. § 6512(a) (1994) makes clear the exclusivity of the Tax Court's authority 
to determine the fact and amount of overpayment under these circumstances:  
If the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency 
under section 6212(a) . . . and if the taxpayer files a petition with 
the Tax Court within the time prescribed in section 6213(a) . . . no 
credit or refund of income tax for the same taxable year . . . shall 
be allowed or made and no suit by the taxpayer for the recovery of any 
part of the tax shall be instituted in any court except--  
(1) As to overpayments determined by a   
decision of the Tax Court which has   
become final . . . . 
 
 It follows that the Tax Court must first make a determination of any outstanding 
overpayment.   
 Bachner argues that in contrast to "voluntary payments" of tax, which may not be 
refundable without a preliminary determination of overpayment, his 1984 wage withholdings 
represent an involuntary "deposit," since he remitted funds  
disputing, rather than acknowledging, his tax liability.  He contends that such a deposit 
becomes an "overpayment" -- and thus immediately refundable -- upon untimely assessment 
alone, and that such a refund should be ordered by this court without remand to the Tax 
Court. 
 There is ample basis to find unpersuasive Bachner's view of wage withholdings as 
"deposits," refundable merely upon late assessment.  See Ehle v. United States, 720
1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpreting I.R.C. § 6513(b)(1), which treats a taxpayer's 
withholdings as "paid by him on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of 
his taxable year," as precluding their treatment as deposits) (emphasis added); Binder v. 
United States, 590 F.2d 68, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting taxpayer's characterization of 
withholdings as deposits where sums remitted to IRS without accompanying indication that 
they not be treated as advance tax payments).   
 In any event, we are neither free nor disposed to overlook the plain statutory 
command of I.R.C. § 6512(a) that where a taxpayer has received a notice of deficiency and 
timely filed a petition in the Tax Court, it is the Tax Court that must determine the fact 
of overpayment and the amount.  The two cases on which Bachner relies, Rosenman v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 658 (1945), and Cohen v. United States, 995 F.2d 205 (Fed. Cir. 1993), 
holding that a "deposit" is to be refunded upon untimely assessment, are inapposite 
 because they did not involve refund claims for tax years already brought before the Tax 
Court for deficiency redeterminations.  Therefore, I.R.C. § 6512 was inapplicable there. 
 The questions of overpayment and refund as to Bachner have not been adjudicate
by the Tax Court.  Having decided that those questions are independent of the deficiency 
issue, we obviously must leave for the Tax Court the determination, in the first instance, 
of the existence and extent of any overpayment by Bachner for the 1984 tax year.  This is 
especially so given Bachner's failure to raise any issues regarding the computation of his 
1984 liabilities or the precise extent of any overpayment. See Huli v. Internal Revenue 
Service, 872 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 1989) (remand appropriate where issues neither briefed 
nor adjudicated below); Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 
1986) (issues not raised before Tax Court inappropriate for appellate review), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987).  It follows that a remand to the Tax Court with respect to 
the 1984 tax year is in order. 
B. 
Tax Year 1985 
 The statute of limitations issue as to Bachner's 1985 tax year is different from 
that he presented as to the 1984 tax year.  The three-year limitations period in I.R.C. § 
6501 begins to run only "after the return was filed."  The Commissioner invokes I.R.C. § 
6501(c)(3) to support his assertion that Bachner's failure to file a return precludes 
operation of the statute of limitations and yields an unlimited period for assessment.  
That section provides: 
In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a 
proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun 
without assessment, at any time. 
 
 I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (1994).   
 Bachner concedes that he filed no Form 1040 or 1040A for the 1985 tax year.  He 
argues nonetheless that the assessment is barred because the W-2 filed by his employer for 
that year constituted a "return" for § 6501(a) purposes.  In support of equating the W
with a § 6501(a) "return," Bachner makes two contentions:  (1) that the W-2 correctly 
reported all of the data required sufficient to compute the tax due, and (2) that the IRS 
"accepted" the W-2 as a valid return in its December 1990 letter declaring his account 
"resolved."   
 Underlying our analysis of Bachner's W-2 contention is the generally applicable 
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court that, in applying limitations provisions, 
"[s]tatutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government  
. . . must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government."  Badaracco v. 
Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis
264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)). 
 There are multiple bases on which to conclude that the Form W-2 submitted by 
Bachner's employer cannot qualify as a return adequate to trigger the limitations period 
on assessment. The statutory requirements are clear.  Each taxpayer must comply with the 
Treasury regulations governing the proper filing of returns. 
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the 
collection thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, 
make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the 
Secretary may from time to time prescribe. 
 
I.R.C. § 6001 (1994) (emphasis added). 
  This encompasses making a return in accordance with the format prescribed by the 
Secretary: 
When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person 
made liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the 
collection thereof, shall make a return or statement according to the 
forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Every person 
required to make a return or statement shall include therein the 
information required by such forms or regulations. 
 
I.R.C. § 6011(a) (1994) (emphasis added).   
 The Treasury regulations, in turn, expressly require taxpayers to file federal 
income tax returns on Forms 1040 or 1040A only, and nowhere make accommodation for Forms 
W-2 as valid surrogates.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(6). 
 The Supreme Court repeatedly has declared that tax returns must comply strictly 
with prescribed requirements in order to trigger applicable limitations periods. See
e.g., Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249 (1930); Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co. 
v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1930); Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 
219, 222-24 (1944). More specifically, the Court has held that inclusion of the taxpayer's 
signature is a prerequisite to the validity of the tax return for purposes of the statute 
of limitations.  See Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 396-97; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering
U.S. 172, 180 (1934).  In Doll v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), 
this court held that the absence of the taxpayer's signature on the taxpayer's return was 
enough to render the return invalid and, as a result, to preclude the operation of the § 
6501(a) limitations period on assessment.  Id. at 714.  Of course, the Form W-2 submitted 
by Bachner's employer bore no signature, and further represented a complete departure from 
the uniform format prescribed in the Treasury regulations.  Bachner frankly admits that 
 his employer's submission of a W-2 is inadequate, stating: "Obviously, a W-2 does not have 
a signature which ordinarily is required to be a return for purposes of the statute of 
limitations."  Brief of Appellant at 15.  He suggests, however, that because the Form W
correctly reported sufficient information to permit computation of his tax liability for 
1985, it must be construed as satisfying §6501(a)'s "return" requirement.  He cites the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 310 (1940), 
for the proposition that the functional adequacy of the information provided, rather than 
compliance with formal requirements, is the determinative feature of a valid return.
 Even were we to assume that that ambitious interpretation were valid, the W
information is not independently sufficient for tax-computation purposes and Bachner fails 
to forward any supporting argument to suggest otherwise. The W-2 submitted, of course, 
included only the amount of Bachner's "Wages, tips, other compensation" for 1985, without 
mention of any other potential sources, types, or amounts of income.  Reporting only one 
item of income cannot be equated with affirmatively declaring zero amounts for all others, 
especially given the IRS's inevitable dependence on after-the-fact audit for effective 
enforcement.  See Di Stephano v. District Director, No. 89-00674 DAE, 1990 WL 74479, at *2 
(D. Haw. Apr. 16, 1990) (determining that Form W-2 claimed as tax return contained 
critical tax information but, in absence of Form 1040, not sufficient information to 
compute liability), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished disposition); 
Zellerbach Paper, 293 U.S. at 182.  Whether or not in retrospect the amount specified on 
the W-2 actually coincided with Bachner's total income for 1985, the W-2 form failed to 
provide facts addressed to or determinative of other potential liabilities and therefore 
was not sufficient to be considered a "return."  See Lane-Wells, 321 U.S. at 223 
 (corporation's income-tax return inadequate for statute-of-limitations purposes, although 
it disclosed all ultimately determinative income information, for failing to "show the 
facts on which liability would be predicated" for a potentially applicable holding-
tax). 
 Bachner's reference to the historical fact that the Internal Revenue Service at 
one time considered a W-2 an income tax return is irrelevant since, as he concedes, that 
regulation, TR § 601.2 (1946), was superseded by TR § 29.51-2(c)(1) (1948), which, like 
its modern-day counterpart in TR § 1.6012-1(a)(6), limited taxpayers to use of Forms 1040 
or 1040A in filing valid returns, absent special and specifically designated 
circumstances.  If anything, the evolution of the Treasury's regulatory return 
requirements demonstrates its affirmative judgment that Forms W-2 are inadequate for 
return-filing purposes.   
 Finally, we cannot find a single federal court decision to have addressed the 
competence of Forms W-2 as tax returns without also rejecting the same.  See Kartrude v. 
Commissioner, 925 F.2d 1379, 1384 (11th Cir. 1991) (W-2 not a return for addition-to
purposes); United States v. Birkenstock, 823 F.2d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1987) (W-2 not 
return for criminal failure-to-file purposes); United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 
1072, 1075 (10th Cir. 1983) (W-2 not return for criminal tax evasion purposes); United 
States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980) (conviction for failure to file return 
upheld where taxpayer submitted W-2 but no properly completed 1040); Di Stephano, 1990 WL 
74479, at *2 (W-2 contains critical tax information, but not sufficient information to 
compute liability in absence of Form 1040); Reiff v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1169 (1981) 
(32-page submission containing W-2 and modified 1040 not valid return). 
  Nor do we find persuasive Bachner's alternative argument that even if his 
employer's submission of the Form W-2 does not alone satisfy the § 6501(a) "return" 
requirement, then the IRS's subsequent notification that Bachner's account was "resolved" 
constituted after-the-fact "acceptance" of the Form as a valid return.   
 The statutory provisions requiring not only the raw submission of returns, but 
also "compl[iance] with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time 
prescribe," I.R.C. § 6001 (1994), and their submission "according to the forms and 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary," I.R.C. § 6011 (1994), directly incorporate the 
Secretary's regulatory requirements as the defining statutory standard.  Any attempted 
waiver by agents with only delegated authority would be ineffective. 
 Even were the relevant return-filing requirements to arise purely from the 
authority of the Secretary to promulgate rules pursuant to a statutory grant, the 
requirements for filing a return set forth in TR § 1.6012-1(a)(6) have the force of law. 
See Boulez v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 209, 213-16 (D.C. Cir.) (Treasury regulation 
requiring written compromise agreements rendered oral agreement between IRS district 
director and taxpayer unauthorized and invalid), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).  The 
mandatory requirements of TR § 1.6012-1(a)(6) are not susceptible to ad hoc rescission.  
See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967) (citing "the settled principle 
that 'Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, 
applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received 
congressional approval and have the effect of law.'" (quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 
U.S. 79, 83 (1938)). 
  Finally, regardless of whether the Commissioner was capable of waiving the 
formal requirements governing return-filing, Bachner has not established that the December 
1990 correspondence might soundly be construed as having waived those requirements.  To 
the extent that Bachner may be arguing that the ambiguous December 1990 letter from the 
IRS1 constitutes a basis to bind the government via equitable estoppel, we reject that 
contention.  See United States v. Pepperman, 976 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (estoppel as 
a result of a government agent's misrepresentations only in "rare and extreme 
circumstances," where the "'interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, 
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government'" is imperiled) (quoting 
Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984)).  Estoppel claims have 
traditionally been put to especial rigor in the taxation context. See, e.g., Automobile 
Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 187 (1957) ("[T]he express condition 
prescribed by the Congress was that the statute was to run against the United States from 
the date of the actual filing of the return, and no action of the Commissioner can change 
or modify the conditions under which the United States consents to the running of the 
statute of limitations against it."); Pilliod Lumber, 281 U.S. at 249 ("Under the 
                     
1
 That letter stated:  "Based on the information you have provided, the account specified 
above is resolved.  We may contact you in the future, if further issues arise requiring 
clarification.  At present, no further response is needed on the above account."  App. at 
61. 
 established general rule a statute of limitations runs against the United States only when 
they assent and upon the conditions prescribed.  Here assent that the statute might begin 
to run was conditioned upon the presentation of a return duly sworn to.  No officer had 
power to substitute something else for the thing specified.").  
 The December 1990 letter fails to provide any basis for a finding of estoppel.  
See United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1987) (employing four-prong analysis).  
First, there was no misrepresentation.  The admittedly vague statement, "the account 
specified above is resolved," is qualified by the explicit reservation of the possibility 
that "further issues" could arise, and the letter's conclusion with the carefully limited 
statement that no further response is required "at present."  Given that "the burden of 
proof is on the party claiming estoppel," Asmar, 827 F.2d at 912, Bachner's estoppel 
attempt fails at the first step. 
 Second, Bachner has demonstrated no detrimental reliance on the December letter.  
Bachner has repeatedly emphasized his ideological objections to the collection of any owed 
income taxes.  Absent any allegation to the contrary, it remains likely that those 
convictions originally expressed in 1984 and 1985, and not any claimed reaction to a 
letter received long after, were the operative catalyst in his refusal to submit anything 
to expand on the Form W-2.  Furthermore, Bachner received the letter more than one year 
after the expiration of any limitations period that would have run upon the filing of a 
valid return for the 1985 tax year.  There is no basis to assume Bachner would have 
submitted voluntarily a conventional return in 1990, when he had already refused to do so 
while still under threat of assessment. 
  Finally, Bachner has shown no affirmative misconduct on the part of the 
government, but at most negligence or mistake of law, neither of which furnishes proper 
grounds for estoppel.  See Pepperman, 976 F.2d at 131 (negligence); Becker v. 
Commissioner, 751 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1984) (mistake of law).  Most telling and 
dispositive is that the December 1990 letter never states that the employer's submission 
of a W-2 form is accepted as a "return" for the tax year 1985. 
 In light of the clarity of the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements, 
the general principle that limitations provisions are construed narrowly against the 
government, and Bachner's failure to provide any persuasive reason otherwise,  
we conclude that the Form W-2 submitted by Bachner's employer is not a "return" within the 
meaning of I.R.C. § 6501(a) and, therefore, that the Commissioner's assessment of 
deficiencies for Bachner's 1985 tax year is not barred. 
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Tax Court's decision with respect 
to the 1984 tax year and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.  With respect to the 1985 tax year, we will affirm the decision of the  
 Tax Court.  Each party to bear its own costs. 
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